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 1 
Introduction 
 Last year I received a Reassigned Time Award to write a book chapter on virtue 
and vice with respect to anger. The award was incredibly helpful and fruitful; my chapter 
is part of a forthcoming volume from Oxford University Press on philosophical accounts 
of individual virtues. I was also able to use some of my research to develop and offer a 
new course: Philosophy and Psychology of Emotion. This year I propose to use NMU’s 
Reassigned Time Award to complete a book chapter on what I term “The Three-Fold 
Significance of the Blaming Emotions.” Many philosophers working on moral 
responsibility (Bennett 1980; Watson 1993; Wallace 1994; Fischer and Ravizza 1998; 
McKenna 1998) follow P.F. Strawson in thinking that we should understand claims about 
someone’s moral responsibility in terms of the appropriateness of the blaming emotions: 
anger, resentment, and indignation (Strawson 1982). But even those who would not 
follow Strawson in identifying moral responsibility attributions with the appropriateness 
of emotions hold that emotions play an important role in our moral responsibility practice 
(Scanlon 2008). In spite of this, the significance of blaming emotions for our moral 
responsibility practices has been philosophically under-theorized. 
In my recent research and writing on virtue and vices of anger, I argue that anger 
has three functions in human psychology. Anger functions as an appraisal of wrongdoing, 
as a motivation to action, and as a communicative device. But this can be extended from 
anger to all three blaming emotions. First, the blaming emotions appraise the actions of a 
person as wrongful. Much of the psychological research on appraisal and emotion holds 
that appraisal causes emotions.  But holding that the blaming emotions are caused by an 
appraisal of a person’s action mistakes the relationship between the two. There is not 
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clear scientific evidence that all episodes of the blaming emotions are caused by a 
relevant appraisal, and not all psychologists agree that appraisals always precede 
emotions or are necessary for it (Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones 2004a; Berkowitz and 
Harmon-Jones 2004b; Parkinson 1999). We better understand the relationship between 
the blaming emotions and appraisal (and emotion and appraisal, more generally) if we 
hold that the blaming emotions are not caused by the appraisal that an act is wrong; 
rather, the blaming emotions are appraisals of actions as wrong (Parkinson 1997). Thus, 
the blaming emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate depending on whether or not 
their appraisal is accurate. 
The blaming emotions also motivate actions. For example, the blaming emotions 
are a common and powerful cause of aggression (Baumeister and Bushman 2007, 66), 
though they are neither necessary nor sufficient for it (Averill 1982; Tavris 1989). In 
general, the blaming emotions energize people, motivate them to approach the target of 
the blaming emotion (E. Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones 2007, 103–105), and lead 
people to try to change their situation (Baumeister and Bushman 2007, 67). Thus, the 
blaming emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate depending on the actions they are 
likely to motivate. 
Finally, the blaming emotions are not just appraisals of a situation that generate 
characteristic motivations; they also involve communicative acts or responses.  For 
example, one of the most striking things about the blaming emotions and anger, in 
particular, is that they are associated with communicative facial expressions (Ekman 
1999). These communications are then observed, responded to, or ignored by other 
people, thus providing another opportunity for emotional engagement. People feeling the 
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blaming emotions communicate that the target of their anger has acted wrongfully and 
urge others to share their anger at the target, thereby, implicitly at least, sharing their 
appraisal of the target. Thus, the blaming emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate 
depending on whether it is appropriate to communicate their appraisal and to urge others 
to share the motivations of the person feeling the blaming emotion.  
Now I am interested in extending these claims to the idea that the blaming 
emotions are tightly connected to our moral responsibility practices thus breaking 
through an impasse in the moral responsibility literature. It is common for a philosopher 
defending one view of moral responsibility to critique that of another as philosophically 
myopic. To take just one example, some philosophers hold that people are morally 
responsible when blaming or praising them produces good consequences (Mill 1979; 
Dennett 1984). That view has recently been criticized as unacceptably shallow 
(Smilansky 2001) because it ignores the appraisal dimension of moral responsibility 
attribution. In response, I argue that this view characterizes important parts of our moral 
responsibility practices in virtue of the motivation function of the blaming emotions. Our 
motivational reserves are not limitless; we have to decide where and when to direct our 
energies. Thus an important constraint on when it makes sense to feel the blaming 
emotions toward someone is whether it would produce good consequences.  
We therefore make more progress in understanding moral responsibility if we 
accept that we have several interests in play in holding people morally responsible and 
that these interests roughly conform to the psychological functions of the blaming 
emotions. No extant theory of moral responsibility takes all three functions into account. 
I argue that to do justice to our moral responsibility practices our theory must take all 
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three into account. My aim in the proposed work is to defend this new theory of moral 
responsibility and show why it is a better candidate for capturing our moral responsibility 
practices than any other extant view. 
Not only do I hope to provide a corrective to simplistic thinking about moral 
responsibility, but I also hope to use the account of moral responsibility that emerges 
from a psychological examination of the blaming emotions to address some puzzling 
issues. For example, my framework can help us understand the moral responsibility of 
psychopaths and people who are morally insane, and I believe my analysis can be 
extended to address the ambivalence we feel about holding responsible wrongdoers who 
have been subject to unfair formative circumstances, as well as the reasons for and 
against holding drug abusers morally responsible.  
This project on the three-fold significance of the blaming emotions will result in 
an 8,000 to 10,000-word chapter to be included in a forthcoming volume of Oxford 
Studies in Agency and Responsibility, edited by David Shoemaker. If I am granted 
reassigned time for the Winter term, I will be able to complete a draft of the chapter by 
the mid-semester recess, with the aim of having two months for revisions and edits before 
the final submission deadline next summer. I also hope to use the fruits of my research to 
develop or augment new courses, as I did with my Philosophy and Psychology of 
Emotion course this term. 
 
Methods 
I term my methodology ‘Psychological and Biological Realism’—the conviction 
that philosophical accounts of morality and other distinctively human concepts must be 
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based on actual human psychology. Because of this interdisciplinary theoretical 
orientation, I must make a practice of staying on top of the literature in several different 
fields: biology, psychology, sociology, and philosophy. This requires an enormous 
amount of attention to developments in these disciples, especially empirical psychology, 
where new work on the emotions and morality is generated almost daily. A Reassigned 
Time Award will thus help ensure that I have time to continue my interdisciplinary 
inquiries. 
  As my methods combine philosophical and sociological inquiry with an eye 
toward new research on relevant psychological and biological mechanisms, I will not 
need any special equipment other than my current NMU resources: my office, computer, 
and library access.  
  
Reassigned Time 
To ensure the successful timely completion of this project, I request a 4-credit 
release for the Winter semester.  My normal teaching load allows time for research, but 
during the Winter term, I am scheduled to teach at least one new upper-level course—
History of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy—as well as two others.  I prefer to not have 
to balance my high standards for teaching against the time-sensitive nature of this 
undertaking.  Four credits of reassigned time will ensure that I can stay true to my 
commitment to discussion-based learning in the classes I will teach while completing this 
significant project. 
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Overview 
 This report covers my NMU Reassigned Time Award for the Winter term of 2011. 
During that term, I received a one-course class reduction; my colleague Sarah Jones 
taught the section of PL180: Fundamentals of Ethical Theory that I had been assigned to 
teach.  
My Reassigned Time Award was incredibly beneficial for the advancement of my 
own research and writing; because of it, I was able to write a book chapter on the virtue 
of Patience and the corresponding vice of Wrath that will be included in an upcoming 
collection under contract with Oxford University Press on philosophical accounts of 
individual virtues and vices. Oxford University Press anticipates a full draft of the book 
to be completed in 2012, with publication to follow that year or the next. I did not seek 
outside grants during my term of reassigned time as the NMU grant provided the 
necessary time and funds to complete my chapter.  
Results 
Patience and Wrath are generally thought to be the virtue and vice with respect to 
anger. My work on this project is an extension of research I first undertook in my 
dissertation, where I developed a philosophical account of anger that I brought to bear on 
the problem of free will. For my chapter, I did additional research in empirical 
psychology and philosophical work on the virtues. Drawing on this research, I argued 
that virtue and vice in anger is determined by excellence or deficiency along three 
functions that anger serves in human psychology: appraisal, motivation, and 
communication.  
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While there has been some recent attention to angry virtue and vice in the 
philosophical literature, most contemporary accounts of virtue in anger allow angry virtue 
to be determined by only one of the three functions that anger serves. So, for example, 
Macalester Bell (2009) holds that virtue in anger is determined only by how appropriate 
someone’s anger is: essentially, does a person get very angry at significant injustices and 
less angry at minor slights? Others, like Lisa Tessman (2005), argue that virtue in anger 
is determined only by how motivated the angry person is to resist injustice and promote 
the flourishing of others.   
In my chapter, I show that this focus on one function of anger to the exclusion of 
others fails to accurately characterize virtue in anger by using the examples of Frederick 
Douglass and Martin Luther King, Jr. Both Douglass and King are thought to be 
exemplars of virtue, so their example helps me to demonstrate that virtue in anger 
requires both getting very angry at major injustices and at the same time being motivated 
to combat them. Douglass and King were both incensed by the treatment of blacks in the 
United States and were motivated to tirelessly oppose such treatment. So the proper 
account of virtue in anger requires attention to both anger’s appropriateness and the sort 
of motivations the angry person has. The examples of Douglass and King also help me 
emphasize that another important function of anger is communication: an excellently 
angry person urges others to become angry at injustice or wrongful conduct and tries to 
motivate them to resist the injustice or wrong, just as both Douglass and King did through 
powerful and inspiring speeches. 
Part of the reason that Douglass and King are moral exemplars, then, is that they 
possessed excellence in anger with respect to appraisal, motivation, and communication. 
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Excellence along all three dimensions is constitutive of virtue in anger. Viciousness in 
anger, on the other hand, is characterized by excessiveness or deficiency along all three 
dimensions. For example, the wrathful person gets angry when it is inappropriate and is 
angrier than the situation warrants. He acts aggressively and impulsively toward others 
and is quick to communicate his excessive anger. The moral danger of wrath is thus 
moral overconfidence and moral insensitivity. The threat of the wrathful person’s anger 
often discourages others from legitimately challenging his authority. This can lead to him 
growing in overconfidence and insensitivity—wrath can thus enter into an increasingly 
vicious cycle with pride (Taylor 2006). 
 I am incredibly grateful for the Reassigned Time Award for providing me the 
time to advance my research outside the philosophical literature into current 
psychological research on the emotions. This was very helpful in grounding and 
advancing my philosophical thinking, and in helping to produce a chapter that, while 
maintaining its philosophical strength, also demonstrates a commitment to 
interdisciplinary thought and research. I was also able to use some of the fruits of my 
research to develop and offer a new class: Philosophy and Psychology of Emotion. I very 
much value the opportunity to share the fruits of my research with NMU students and I 
am committed to continuing to do so in the future.  
 
Further Directions 
 While I continue to revise and revisit my thinking about vice and virtue with 
respect to anger, my philosophical and psychological research on anger and other 
emotions leads in several promising directions. Here I highlight just one. I am 
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particularly interested in exploring the connection between emotions like anger and 
certain moral concepts, like moral responsibility. My view is that we can understand 
more about moral responsibility and thereby have a greater appreciation of the conditions 
under which it is appropriate to hold people morally responsible if we have a greater 
understanding of emotions, like anger, that I believe help to shape our concept of moral 
responsibility. If anger has several different psychological functions, that should mean 
that moral responsibility is a concept with several functions as well. I hope to explore the 
implications of this thesis in future work. 
